The researchers, led by computer science professor Todd Humphreys, published their findings in a paper titled "Low-Cost Spoofing of GPS Receivers in Unmanned Aircraft Systems." The paper was presented at the 25th USENIX Security Symposium in August 2016.
The researchers found that it is possible to spoof the GPS signals used by drones by using a relatively inexpensive software-defined radio (SDR). SDRs are devices that can be programmed to transmit and receive radio signals at different frequencies.
The researchers used an SDR to create a fake GPS signal that was stronger than the real GPS signal. This caused the drone to believe that it was in a different location than it actually was. The researchers were able to control the drone's movement by changing the fake GPS signal.
The researchers also found that it is possible to spoof the GPS signals used by drones that have anti-spoofing measures in place. These measures are designed to make it more difficult to spoof GPS signals. However, the researchers found that these measures can be easily bypassed by using a more sophisticated SDR.
The researchers' findings have implications for the security of drones. Drones are increasingly being used for a variety of purposes, including military operations, law enforcement, and commercial deliveries. If attackers are able to spoof the GPS signals used by drones, they could potentially cause these drones to crash or be controlled remotely.
The researchers recommend that drone manufacturers take steps to make their drones more resistant to GPS spoofing. These steps include using more sophisticated anti-spoofing measures, such as encryption and signal authentication.
The researchers also recommend that drone operators be aware of the risk of GPS spoofing and take steps to mitigate this risk. These steps include using drones that have anti-spoofing measures in place and being aware of the signs of GPS spoofing, such as sudden changes in the drone's movement.
